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THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

FISCHEL, WILLIAM A. Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics.
Pp. xi, 415. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1995. $45.00.
William Fischel's Regulatory Takings
confronts one of the most difficult and
significant questions in constitutional
law: how should courts determine which
government regulations run afoul of the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment,
which requires the government to provide compensation when it takes private
property? Broadly read, the clause would
bar government regulations with redistributive consequences, thus rendering
the modern regulatory state unconstitu-

tional. This reading, championed by Professor Richard Epstein, has achieved
great prominence in academic and political debates, but the vast preponderance
of judges and academic commentators
finds such a result both unattractive and
unsound in terms of constitutional structure. None of the numerous alternative
substantive readings of the clause that
have been advanced, however, has won
general acceptance (or anything close).
Fischel seeks to shift the terms of what
has become a stalemated debate by advancing a political process theory approach to the clause. Stressing the need
for judicial modesty in a system of democratic government and the limits of judicial capacity (particularly with regard to
the federal bench), he argues that courts
should "largely avert their eyes from the
regulatory excesses of Congress and, for
the most part, of state legislatures." But
close judicial scrutiny oflocal regulations
is appropriate for several reasons: (1) local
government decisions, in contrast to
decisions at the state and national levels,
are particularly likely to fall on unrepresented outsiders; (2) local politics are peculiarly subject to process failure;
and (3) courts alone can provide redress.
Even so, the judicial role here is limited.
Movable property does not need special
judicial protection. Thus courts should
focus their attention primarily on local
regulatory unfairness that affects immovable property, the principal form of
which is land.
The strongest part of Fischel's argument is the central premise that courts
should in general defer to the political
process, except where process failure is
most likely. Others have in recent years
advanced process theories of the takings
clause (including myself), and Fischel has
advanced this thesis previously. But, as
he develops his point here, he gives it
great richness and power. Regulatory
Takings is, very simply, a tour de force.

BOOK DEPARTMENT

Fischel masterfully draws on not only his
native discipline of economics but also,
among other things, legal history, political theory, jurisprudence, relevant empirical studies, the case law and
intriguing background facts that he has
uncovered about the leading cases, the
enormous legal literature on takings, and
his own experience on the Hanover, New
Hampshire, Zoning Board.
As Fischel elaborates on his position,
however, his claims are less compelling.
In particular, he does not adequately explain why political appeals to state legislatures or the state electorate to overturn
local decisions or to impose compensation
requirements on local governments do
not provide adequate nonjudicial redress
for process failure at the local level. Similarly, in discussing actual takings cases,
Fischel pronounces regulations unconstitutional with a frequency that is inconsistent with his broader claim that the
judicial role should be limited. What this
principally illustrates, however, is not
analytic weakness but the intractability
of the takings issue. As it probes that
issue with sophistication and subtlety
(and in a lucid style that is a pleasure to
read), Regulatory Takings not only makes
an important contribution to the literature on takings law and on land use; it
makes a place for itself as a major work
on the larger subject of property rights
and the Constitution.
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